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Abstract 
 
In this study, we explore the pattern of efficiency among enterprises in China‘s 29 
provinces across different ownership types in heavy and light industries and across 
different regions (coastal, central and western).  We do so by performing a bootstrap-
based analysis of group efficiencies (weighted and non-weighted), estimating and 
comparing densities of efficiency distributions, and conducting a bootstrapped 
truncated regression analysis.  We find evidence of interesting differences in 
efficiency levels among various ownership groups, especially for foreign and local 
ownership, which have different patterns for light and heavy industries.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Extraordinary changes have taken place in China over the past three decades since the 
adoption of the open door policy. These changes have been exemplified by those seen 
in China‘s industrial structure, especially in the radical moves toward non-state 
ownership. The corporatization of the state sector, the government‘s encouragement 
of merger and acquisition activity among state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the 
dramatic development of the non-state sector with enormous foreign investments have 
dominated both the Chinese economy and political debate for the past decade.  
The purpose of this paper is to tackle the timeworn political debate about 
which type of ownership is more efficient in the Chinese economy and whether it 
depends on the industry (light or heavy) and/or the region (central, western or 
coastal).  While the literature includes many studies of productivity in China (see the 
citations below), none have focused on the relative efficiency of various ownership 
types for both light and heavy industry combined. This is the issue we attempt to 
address in our study.  Our particular focus is on foreign versus local ownership.  
While there is little doubt that private ownership should outperform state ownership 
on average, the situation is not so clear for foreign versus local ownership and 
whether it depends on the type of industry. 
To achieve our goal, we use the most recent census data constructed for 
Chinese enterprises of different ownership types in 1995.  Our methodological 
approach exploits recent developments in the area of efficiency analysis and is 
implemented in two stages.  The first stage involves the estimation of efficiency 
scores for individual observations (each province in each type of industry) using the 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) estimator.  In the next stage, we analyze the 
individual efficiency scores obtained in the first stage using three different methods.  
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The first method is based on the analysis of densities of efficiency distributions for 
different ownership groups using a kernel density estimator and testing for their 
equalities using an adaptation of the Li (1996) test.  The second method is based on 
the aggregation method of Färe and Zelenyuk (2003) and investigates group 
efficiency scores obtained as weighted averages, with the weights representing the 
economic importance of each observation.  Statistical inferences for these group 
efficiency scores are made via bootstrapping techniques suggested by Simar and 
Zelenyuk (2007).  The third method assumes more of a dependency structure and 
allows us to analyze the dependency of efficiency scores on hypothetical explanatory 
variables.  Here, we use the truncated regression proposed by Simar and Wilson 
(2007) in which bootstrapping is used as a means of statistical inference to 
investigate how the conditional mean of efficiency scores is influenced by 
explanatory variables such as ownership and regional dummies, as well as by size. 
These methods yield interesting evidence of performance variations among 
ownership groups and regions.  Remarkably, the pattern of performance for light 
industry is found to differ from that for heavy industry.    
In common with the results of other studies, our results provide robust 
evidence confirming the expectation that non-state ownership is superior to state 
ownership in terms of the performance levels achieved.  In addition, we confirm our 
prediction that foreign owned firms in heavy industry perform distinctly better than 
their counterparts with other ownership types.  Somewhat surprisingly, foreign 
ownership in light industry appears to be associated with lower efficiency, on average, 
than the other non-state ownership types we consider.  This unexpected result can 
nevertheless be explained by the theory of technology diffusion/adoption, which can 
be traced back at least as far as the studies of Gerschenkron (1962) and Nelson and 
Phelps (1966).     
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Among our other findings, we present evidence of agglomeration effects that 
are pronounced in light industry but are not particularly marked in heavy industry.  
Interestingly, we find no significant difference in average efficiency between light and 
heavy industries.  Overall, apart from confirming a number of previous findings, our 
study sheds new light on the pattern of productivity in China that will be of interest to 
researchers and practitioners.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly 
discusses our methodology and Section 3 provides a brief discussion of the data.  
Section 4 reports the empirical results in detail and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Methodology 
Estimation of Efficiency (Stage 1) 
 
In the first stage of our analysis, we use the data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
estimator to obtain efficiency scores for each observation.
 
 This approach usually 
assumes that all decision-making units (DMUs) within a sample have access to the 
same technology for transforming a vector of N inputs, x, into a vector of M outputs, 
y.
1
  We also assume that technology can be characterized by the technology set, T, as
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Note that while our approach requires that all DMUs have access to the same 
technology, it also allows for any DMU to be either on or away from the frontier of 
such technology.  The distance from each DMU in T to the frontier of T is called the 
                                                 
1
 The DEA was originally designed for firm-level analysis, but it has frequently been applied to more 
aggregated data; see, for example, Färe et al. (1994) and the more recent studies of Kumar and Russell 
(2002), Henderson and Russell (2005), and Henderson and Zelenyuk (2006).  
2
 We assume that the standard regularity conditions of the neo-classical production theory hold (see 
Färe and Primont (1995) for details). 
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inefficiency of each DMU caused by endogenous or exogenous factors specific to that 
DMU. These endogenous factors could include internal economic incentives 
influenced by motivation systems, ownership structure, management quality, etc. 
Exogenous factors might include different demographic or geographic environments, 
regulatory policies, and so on. Our goal is to estimate such inefficiency and analyze 
its dependency on the hypothesized factors.  
Technical efficiency for each DMU          is measured using the 
Farrell/Debreu-type output-oriented technical efficiency measure  
 
                          
         .    (2) 
 
Obviously, the true T is unobserved, and so we replace it with its DEA-estimate,   , 
obtained through the following activity analysis model  
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where               are the intensity variables over which optimization (2) is 
made.
 
Note that such    is the smallest convex free disposal cone (in      -space) that 
contains (or ‗envelopes‘) the input-output data. 3  In our discussions, we focus on the 
constant returns to scale (CRS) model only for several reasons. First, the CRS model 
(2) has greater discrimination power, making it capable of identifying more 
inefficiency than non-CRS models.  Some of the inefficiency identified under the 
CRS model will be due to the scale effect (i.e., where a DMU is too small or too 
large), which will be tested at the second stage by including a proxy for scale. Second, 
the CRS model compares all DMUs evenly to the same cone, whereas for the non-
                                                 
3
 Alternatively, if we add           or    
  
      to (3), then we can model the non-increasing 
returns to scale (NIRS) or the variable returns to scale (VRS), respectively.   
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CRS DEA estimator, a large proportion of DMUs are often in or near the flat regions 
of the estimated technology and so obtain high or perfect efficiency scores while 
being quite inefficient from an economic perspective.  Third, the CRS model is a 
natural choice when aggregate (country- or region-level) data are used. 
We choose the Farrell efficiency measure over others for two reasons that 
make it the most popular in practice.  This measure has been shown to satisfy a set of 
attractive mathematical properties that are desirable in an efficiency measure.
4
  
Moreover, this estimator is fairly easy in terms of computation and allows for 
straightforward interpretation. 
Note that the true efficiency scores from the Farrell measure are bounded 
between unity and infinity, where unity represents a perfect (technical or 
technological) efficiency score of 100%.  On the other hand,         would represent 
the relative %-level of the efficiency of the  th DMU (         ).  By replacing T 
with    in (2), we obtain the DEA estimator of     under the assumptions of CRS, 
additivity, and free disposability.  Applying this estimator will give estimates of the 
true efficiency scores,              , which we denote as              .  
These estimated efficiency scores have the same range as the true efficiency scores 
and, as in many other extreme-value type estimates, are subject to small-sample bias, 
which nevertheless vanishes asymptotically as the estimates are consistent with their 
true counterparts.
5
 
 
                                                 
4
 These properties include various forms of continuity, (weak) monotonicity, commensurability, 
homogeneity, and (weak) indication for all technologies satisfying certain regularity conditions (see 
Russell (1990, 1997) for details). 
5
 See Korostelev et al. (1995) and Park et al. (2010) for proof of consistency and rates of convergence 
of the DEA estimator under CRS, and other statistical properties and required assumptions.  Also see 
Kneip et al. (1998, 2008) for related results on VRS. 
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Analysis of Efficiency Distributions (Method 1 of Stage 2) 
 
The aim of the second stage of the analysis is to study the dependency of the 
efficiency scores obtained in the first stage on DMU-specific factors such as 
ownership structure, regional location, size, etc.   
The starting point of our second stage analysis is to explore the efficiencies 
within and between groups that might theoretically represent different sub-populations 
in the population as a whole.  For example, state-owned firms have different 
incentives to other firms which are likely to be reflected in the efficiency distribution 
of state-owned firms relative to other firms.  In particular, we first analyze the 
distributions of efficiency within various groups.  Here, we start with estimation and 
visualization of the densities of corresponding distributions using the kernel density 
estimator. For this we use the Gaussian kernel, Silverman (1986) reflection method 
(around unity), to take into account the bounded support of efficiency measure, and 
Sheather and Jones (1991) method for bandwidth selection.  We then apply a version 
of the Li (1996) test (adapted to the DEA context by Simar and Zelenyuk (2006)) to 
test the equality of efficiency distributions between various groups of interest.  
 
Analysis of Aggregate Efficiency Scores (Method 2 of Stage 2) 
 
We proceed to analyze the various groups by testing the equality of group (aggregate) 
efficiencies, which is estimated using the weighted and non-weighted averages of the 
individual efficiency scores for each group.  Because the weights used for averaging 
might be critical here, they must be chosen on the basis of some (more-or-less) 
objective criterion.  We use the weights derived from economic optimization by Färe 
and Zelenyuk (2003) which were extended to the sub-group case by Simar and 
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Zelenyuk (2007). In summary, our (weighted) group efficiency score for group l (l = 
1, …, L) is estimated as 
 
                  
  
                        .     (4) 
 
where the weights are 
 
                 
  
                    .     (5) 
 
in which p is the vector of output prices.  For convenience, we would present the 
reciprocals of the estimated group efficiency scores, i.e.,          
  
             (and 
the corresponding confidence intervals) to give them meaning in percentage terms. 
To make statistical inferences based on these group efficiency scores, we use 
the bootstrap-based approach suggested by Simar and Zelenyuk (2007); readers are 
referred to the same study for further details of this method. In summary, the statistic 
used for testing the null hypothesis that the aggregate efficiencies for any two groups, 
e.g., A and Z, are equal (i.e.,           
         ) is given by the relative difference (RD) 
statistic: 
 
         
                        (6) 
 
The null hypothesis will be rejected (at certain level of confidence) in favor of 
          
           if           (or           
           if         ) and the bootstrap-
estimated confidence interval of       does not overlap with unity.   
 
Regression Analysis of Determinants of Efficiency (Method 3 of Stage 2) 
 
The last method used in our investigation involves the application of regression 
analysis to study the dependency between efficiency scores and some expected 
explanatory variables.  Here, we assume and test the following specification 
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            ,  j = 1, …, n,     (7) 
 
where a is the constant term,    is statistical noise, and    is a (row) vector of 
observation-specific variables for DMU j that we expect to influence DMU efficiency 
score,    , defined in (2), through the vector of parameters    (common for all j) that 
we need to estimate.   
For some time, a practice commonly adopted in the DEA literature was to 
estimate model (7) using the Tobit-estimator. However, Simar and Wilson (2007) 
illustrate that this approach would be incorrect here and instead propose an approach 
based on a bootstrapped truncated regression, showing that it performs satisfactorily 
in Monte Carlo experiments. We follow their approach (specifically, their ―Algorithm 
2‖) and instead of using the unobserved regressand in (7),    , use its bias-corrected 
estimate,     
 
, which is obtained using the heterogeneous parametric bootstrap they 
propose. Note that because both sides of (7) are bounded by unity, the distribution of 
   is restricted by the condition          . To simplify the estimation process, 
we follow Simar and Wilson (2007) by assuming that this distribution is a truncated 
normal distribution with a mean of zero, unknown variance, and a (left) truncation 
point determined by           .  Formally, our econometric model is given by 
    
          ,  j = 1, …, n,     (8) 
where 
         
  , such that           ,   j = 1, …, n.   (9) 
 
We then use our data to estimate the model shown in (8)-(9) by maximizing the 
corresponding likelihood function with respect to     
  . To obtain the bootstrap 
confidence intervals for the estimates of parameters      
  , we use the parametric 
bootstrap for regression that incorporates information on the parametric structure (7) 
and the distributional assumption (9). For the sake of brevity, we refer readers to 
Simar and Wilson (2007) for the details of the estimation algorithm. 
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3. Data 
 
The data used in this paper are drawn from the Third National Industrial Census of 
the People’s Republic of China conducted by the State Statistical Bureau in 1995, 
which is the latest census for which statistics have been put together and published.  
The data provided in the census are the only industry-level data available that are 
categorized by type of ownership.  Specifically, the census provides cross-sectional 
data for Chinese enterprises divided into four ownership types that are aggregated at 
the province level (29 provinces) for light and heavy industries in 1995.  The four 
types of ownership are: (i) state-owned enterprises (SOEs); (ii) foreign-funded 
enterprises (FFEs); (iii) township-owned enterprises (TOEs); and (iv) collectively- 
owned enterprises (COEs).  Given these data, we have 8 ‗representative‘ DMUs for 
each of the 29 provinces in China: SOEs, FFEs, TOEs, and COEs in the light and 
heavy industries, respectively.  
 A brief explanation of the industry sectors is warranted here.  ―Light industry‖ 
refers to the group of industries that produce consumer goods and hand tools. It 
consists of two categories distinguished from each other according to the materials 
used.  The first category include industries that use farm products as materials, while 
the other category includes industries that use non-farm products as materials.
6
  
―Heavy industry‖ refers to industries that produce capital goods and provide materials 
and technical bases required by various sectors of the national economy.
7
  The level of 
                                                 
6
 Some examples of the first category of light industries are food and beverage manufacturing, tobacco 
processing, and textiles and clothing, and some examples of the second category are the manufacturing 
of chemicals, synthetic fibers, chemical products, and glass products. 
7
 Heavy industry consists of three branches distinguished according to the purpose of production or 
how the products are used. They include (i) the mining, quarrying and logging industry that involves 
the extraction of natural resources; (ii) the raw materials industry, which provides raw materials, fuel 
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competition among light industry firms is generally more severe than that among 
heavy industry participants because there are usually more firms in the former group. 
Also, because most light industry firms are non-SOEs, they face hard-budget 
constraints and are fully responsible for their profits and losses.  On the other hand, 
because most heavy industry firms are SOEs which are larger and fewer in number, 
the level of competition between such firms is usually lower than it is among light 
industry firms.  
To construct the constant returns to scale (CRS) output-oriented activity 
analysis model for the DEA estimator in the first stage, we use three inputs (i.e., total 
wage, the net value of fixed assets, and the value of intermediate inputs) and one 
output (the gross industrial output of each type of ownership in each province).  Some 
descriptive statistics and a brief discussion of the data are provided in the Appendix. 
Further details can be found in two studies conducted by Shiu (2000, 2001). 
 
 
4. Main Results 
 
Analysis of Densities and Means for Light Industry 
After obtaining the DEA estimates of efficiency scores, we use the kernel density 
estimator to approximate the distributions of the individual efficiency scores for the 
four ownership groups in each of the light and heavy industry sectors. Statistical tests 
for the equality of distributions suggested by Li (1996) (and adapted to the DEA 
context by Simar and Zelenyuk (2006)) are used to test for differences in distributions 
amongst the ownership groups.  Figure 1 shows the (estimated) densities of the 
distributions of the estimated individual efficiency scores for each ownership group in 
                                                                                                                                            
and power to various sectors of the economy; and (iii) the manufacturing industry, which processes raw 
materials.  
 12 
the light industry sector. The estimated densities seem to be relatively divergent 
among groups. Interestingly, the only ownership group that has a density with an 
estimated mode of unity is the TOEs.  Intuitively, this means that for TOEs, the 
highest frequency at which the level of efficiency is observed is where one would 
expect it to be for highly competitive firms: at the 100% level of efficiency.  Other 
groups have estimated modes that are not at unity but are instead at some level of 
inefficiency, which we view as evidence of some degree of ‗pathological‘ inefficiency.  
The SOE group has the most ‗inefficient‘ mode (around 2, i.e., about 50% efficient), 
making it radically different from other groups and the least efficient group.  Columns 
2 and 3 of Table 1 present the results of tests for the equality of distributions between 
all dyads of ownership groups in the light industry sector; we reject equality for most 
of the comparisons at the 95% confidence level. The exceptions are the efficiency 
distributions of foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs) and township-owned enterprises 
(TOEs) versus collectively- owned enterprises (COEs). We also reject equality for 
foreign-funded enterprises versus collectively-owned enterprises at the 10% level (est. 
p-value of 0.06).   
Given the evidence of different efficiency distributions among ownership 
groups, a further issue that arises is whether this divergence is due to differences in 
group aggregate efficiency scores and whether these differences are statistically 
significant.  The upper part of Table 2 lists the weighted efficiency scores for each 
light industry ownership group in the 29 provinces in 1995. The aggregate efficiency 
scores are calculated using Färe-Zelenyuk weights, with bias corrected and confidence 
intervals estimated on the basis of the Simar-Zelenyuk (2007) group-wise-
heterogeneous bootstrap-based approach. The second column indicates the ownership 
groups. The numbers in the third and fifth columns represent the reciprocals of the 
original DEA efficiency scores and of the bias-corrected efficiency scores, 
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respectively.  (Reciprocals are taken for convenience to show the percentage meaning 
of the efficiency scores.) The last two columns show the lower and upper bounds of 
the 95% confidence interval. 
The results in the upper part of Table 2 indicate that SOE performance is 
different from non-SOE performance. A relatively large estimated bias in the 
aggregates of efficiency scores is found among all ownership groups, especially for 
SOEs (0.55 and 0.43). This indicates that in the light industry sector, the technical 
efficiency of SOEs varies widely across the provinces.  
Furthermore, bootstrap-based tests of the equality of aggregate efficiencies are 
employed to test for pair-wise comparisons of the aggregate efficiencies of the various 
sub-groups (see the lower part of Table 2). The relative difference (RD) statistics 
computed for the DEA and bias-corrected aggregate efficiency scores are shown in 
the third and fifth columns, respectively. If the RD statistic for group A versus group 
Z is greater than 1 and the confidence interval does not overlap with 1, then the null 
hypothesis that the aggregate efficiencies of the two groups are equal is rejected in 
favor of the alternative hypothesis that the aggregate efficiency of group A is worse 
than that of group Z.
8
 The RD statistics suggest that SOEs are operated in a 
significantly (at the 1% level) less efficient manner than all the other groups. This 
finding supports the results obtained in our distributional analysis and can be 
explained by the fact that SOEs are often ill-equipped to meet their business 
objectives as they tend to use out-of-date capital equipment and usually have no 
funding available to them for technological upgrades (for more discussion, see Groves 
et al., 1994; Weitzman and Xu, 1994; Zheng et al., 1998; Zhang and Zhang, 2001; 
Dong and Tang, 1995; Lin et al., 1998; Huang et al., 1999; Wu, 1996 and 1998). 
                                                 
8
 E.g., the RD-statistic for comparing the weighted average efficiency scores for groups 1 and 2 was 
estimated as                          , meaning that group 1 is less efficient than group 2, and this 
difference is significant, since 95% confidence interval is [1.23, 1.62], not overlapping with 1. 
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Regarding the performance of non-SOEs, it is interesting to find that in the 
light industry sector, FFEs perform significantly less efficiently than COEs and TOEs 
(at the 5% level for weighted averages and at the 10% level for non-weighted 
averages). One possible explanation for this result is that the network of bureaucratic 
restrictions adversely affecting the competitiveness of FFEs offset the benefits gained 
from the government‘s preferential policies for foreign investors. Examples include 
high-profile administrative intervention in the operation of FFEs, the levying of 
miscellaneous fees of an ambiguous nature, and the imposition of stringent policies. 
(For more discussion, see ACC, 1998; Melvin, 1998; Weldon and Vanhonacker, 1999; 
Transparency International, 2001). These issues could lead to higher transaction costs 
being incurred in FFE operations and thereby cancel out certain competitive 
advantages enjoyed by FFEs over local firms (see, for example, Yeung and Mok, 
2002). Other reasons that may account for the lower level of efficiency in FFE 
operations include the large initial investment required and the steep learning curve 
for foreign investors (e.g., see Wei et al., 2002).
 
 
 
Analysis of Densities and Means for Heavy Industry 
 
Figure 2 shows the (estimated) densities of individual efficiency distributions of the 
four ownership groups for the heavy industry sector. The densities appear to be more 
tightly grouped in the heavy industry sector than those observed for the light industry 
sector, other than in the case of FFEs, for which we see a clear difference in the 
density of efficiency relative to that of the other groups.  The SOEs group again has 
less of its distributional mass close to unity, while the FFEs group has more of its 
distribution close to unity than the other groups.  Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 formally 
support these observations via tests for the equality of distributions between the four 
groups in the heavy industry sector.  Note that the overall situation in the heavy 
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industry sector is somewhat different from what we have seen for the light industry 
sector.  The efficiency distributions cannot be statistically distinguished from each 
other, the sole exception being the FFEs, for which the distribution appears to be 
significantly different from those of all the other groups.  We also observe 
significance at the 10% level for TOEs versus COEs (which are not significantly 
different from each other in the light industry sector).  
The results reported in the upper part of Table 3 also show that in comparison 
with the light industry ownership groups, all the ownership groups in the heavy 
industry sector have relatively small aggregate inefficiency scores and an (absolutely 
and relatively) lower level of estimated bias. These results suggest that performance 
varies to a lesser degree among ownership types in the heavy industry sector. This 
could be explained by the fact that heavy industry operations are more stable than are 
operations in the light industry sector, which is more dynamic and features larger 
numbers of firms breaking through and firms lagging behind, thereby causing more 
variation in efficiency.  In addition, because heavy industry is more capital-intensive 
in nature and light industry is more labor-intensive, greater automation in the 
production process leads to less human-driven inefficiency (such as human mistakes 
and shirking on the job) in the heavy industry sector. Firms operating in heavy 
industries therefore tend to operate in a relatively similar manner and are more similar 
in terms of performance, both of which contribute to less variation in efficiency 
estimates and, in turn, less estimated bias. 
Although it has long been held that SOEs are less efficient than their non-state 
owned counterparts, our results from the analysis of densities and aggregate 
efficiencies do not provide strong support for this view in the case of the heavy 
industry sector. Specifically, a comparison of weighted aggregate efficiencies between 
the heavy industry groups using RD statistics indicates no statistical difference 
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between them. This result could be attributed to the high level of automation in 
production activities in the heavy industry sector, a factor which has been discussed in 
the previous paragraph.  
A similar test for the non-weighted efficiency scores confirms the 
insignificance of the differences between these group efficiencies, other than for the 
FFEs, which appear to be more efficient than SOEs and TOEs (at about the 10% 
significance level) and COEs (at about the 1% significance level).  This is consistent 
with our analysis of the distributions for these groups, but contrasts with the results 
obtained for the light industry sector, where we find that FFEs perform significantly 
less efficiently than COEs and TOEs, while SOEs perform significantly worse than all 
of the other groups. We explain this difference between the industry sectors in more 
detail later in this work.   
 
Truncated Regression Analysis 
 
The regression analysis method we employ is not simply a generalization of the above 
analysis because it imposes a particular structure on the dependency between the 
efficiency of a DMU and the hypothesized explanatory variables. Moreover, the 
dependent variable (i.e., the efficiency score), does not account for the economic 
weight (e.g., size) of the observations.  Nevertheless, this analysis complements the 
methods used above in a number of very important respects.  In particular, it allows 
for inferences to be drawn about different factors that simultaneously influence 
efficiency scores by focusing on the (marginal) effect of each variable.  One 
additional advantage of this approach is that it allows for the effects of continuous 
variables to be investigated. 
Our empirical specification shown on the right-hand side of regression 
equation (8) includes the intercept, dummy variables and one continuous variable.  
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The first dummy variable is the industry indicator (1 for light industry and 0 for heavy 
industry).  The next three dummies – D2, D3, and D4 – represent the DMU ownership 
type and take the value of 1 if the observation belongs to a group of FFEs, TOEs and 
COEs, respectively. Thus, for the sake of convenience in testing, the group of state 
owned enterprises is taken as the base and so the coefficients on D2, D3 and D4 
would estimate the difference in effects between the corresponding group (e.g., FFEs 
for D2) and the group of SOEs. For example, a negative coefficient on D2 would 
suggest evidence that FFEs introduce improvements relative to SOEs, on average.  
The next two dummies – D5 and D6 – represent the regions and are assigned 
the value of 1 if the observation belongs to the coastal and central regions, 
respectively.
 9
  That is, the coefficients on each of these dummies will estimate the 
difference in effects between their region (e.g., coastal) and the western region, which 
is taken as the base.  The continuous variable on the right-hand side of the regression 
model is used to control for the size effects (measured as the logarithm of output) of 
DMUs.  The size effect variable is expected to capture at least part of the 
agglomeration effect of the province: the larger the gross output of a particular type of 
firm in a province in a given industry, the higher we expect the efficiency level to be 
for this type of ownership.  The agglomeration effect is expected to have a positive 
influence on efficiency for at least two reasons.  First, there is a spillover effect 
derived from the activities of firms that are in the same general industry sector (light 
or heavy) but are not direct competitors (e.g., shoemakers versus textile producers, 
                                                 
9
 We follow the categorization used by the State Planning Commission of China: (1) the Coastal region, 
which includes Beijing, Tianjin, Heibei, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Hainan, and Guangxi; (2) the Central region, which includes Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, and Hubei; and (3) the Western region, which includes 
Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. 
 18 
etc.).  Second, there is also a competition effect between firms producing the same 
products that is expected to encourage firms to strive for greater efficiency.  We 
expect both effects (the spillover and competition effects) to be ‗proxied‘ by this size 
control variable, but unfortunately cannot decompose it into its two components in our 
data or results because of the aggregate nature of our data.  
The results of our bootstrapped (truncated) regression analysis with DEA are 
presented in Table 4.
10
  We run several specifications to test the robustness of our 
conclusions.  The results confirm our previous findings, but also shed some additional 
light on the issue under study.  We see consistently strong evidence for the argument 
that at an aggregate level, non-SOEs of all types of ownership have significantly 
higher efficiency levels than their SOE counterparts.  This evidence is robust in that it 
is confirmed by all the regression specifications we run.  While this result is also 
consistent with those of many studies and is therefore not surprising, we also provide 
some interesting new results. 
Turning to the pooled models (models 1 to 4) in which we consider both 
industries under the same frontier, the greatest efficiency improvement over that of 
SOEs comes from TOEs and is followed in turn by FFEs and COEs.  
The size effect in all four models is found to be significant such that larger 
output leads to a better (smaller, i.e., closer to unity) efficiency score, on average. 
This finding supports the hypothesis of a positive spillover effect on efficiency. That 
is, the more activities (total output) performed by a particular type of enterprise in a 
certain province, the higher the efficiency level is expected to be for that type of 
                                                 
10
 The significance tests are based on bootstrapped confidence intervals using Algorithm 2 of Simar and 
Wilson (2007), with 1000 replications for the bootstrap bias correction of the DEA estimates and 2000 
replications for the bootstrapping of the regression coefficients. 
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enterprise. Notably, the coefficient of the industry dummy is insignificant (and near 
zero) in Model 1, so we drop it from Model 2 and, as expected, observe almost no 
change in the estimates. Interestingly, the coefficients on the regional dummies are 
insignificant in both Model 1 and Model 2, so we drop these dummies from Model 3 
and again see almost no change in the coefficients.  In Model 4, we drop both the 
industry dummy and the regional dummies and the coefficients remain almost the 
same as in the previous three models.  These results suggest that, at least on this 
aggregate level, neither type of industry nor location has a real effect on the level of 
efficiency. This finding is
 
contrary to the conventional expectation, at least for the 
coastal region versus the western or even the central region.
11
   
More interesting results are revealed when we consider each industry 
separately. Models 5, 6, and 9 consider light industry alone, while models 7, 8, and 10 
consider heavy industry in isolation.  There is no qualitative change in most of the 
results.  The region dummies remain insignificant (and almost zero for heavy 
industry).  However, note that the size effect is much more pronounced now for light 
industry and is much less pronounced in the heavy industry sector relative to what we 
observed in the pooled models.  This suggests that although the agglomeration effect 
is present in the heavy industry sector, it is much less pronounced than it is in the light 
industry environment.   
Also note that in the heavy industry context, the largest improvement on state 
ownership comes from FFEs, while the coefficient on the dummy representing the 
                                                 
11
 However, Zelenyuk (2009) reports Monte Carlo evidence suggesting that the power of the test of the 
significance of coefficients on dummy variables in the Simar-Wilson (2006) model is very low, even 
when the true difference is quite substantial from an economic standpoint.  It is therefore likely that in 
some cases we are simply unable to reject the null hypothesis of equality of efficiencies due to a 
relatively small sample size, which is clearly not the same as accepting the null hypothesis. 
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efficiency difference between COEs and SOE is barely significant.  (Recall that in the 
foregoing analysis, we could not confidently reject the differences between the 
aggregate group efficiency scores for heavy industry.)  On the other hand, we find that 
in light industry, FFEs make the smallest improvement relative to SOEs (smaller than 
the other types of ownership), so we use Model 9 to test the efficiency difference 
between FFEs and other types of ownership in the light industry sector.  We see that 
while SOEs are significantly less efficient than FFEs on average (as was also seen in 
models 5 and 6), the latter are significantly less efficient than the other (non-state 
local) ownership groups.  Although this result might be somewhat unexpected, it is 
consistent with the results we obtain using other methods and is robust in this sense. 
Zelenyuk and Zheka (2006) report a similar result for foreign ownership on a 
disaggregated level in another transitional country (Ukraine). 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Over the past three decades, the Chinese economy and its industrial structure have 
experienced remarkable changes which have been rooted in the reform and open door 
policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978.  Although these changes have continued to 
gain pace over time, their impact has not been uniform across different types of 
ownership, industries, and regions in China. Given the continued growth of China‘s 
economic power since the turn of the new millennium, it is imperative to gain a better 
understanding of how China has achieved its economic success and how its economy 
will evolve in the near future. 
In this paper, we investigate efficiency levels and their determinants for 
different types of ownership, industries and regions in China.  The question of the 
performance of different types of ownership in general, and in China in particular, is a 
very sensitive issue that often carries political connotations.  It goes without saying 
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that great care is required in selecting reliable methods.  We employ several recently 
developed efficiency analysis methods to examine efficiency variations across 
different cohorts of Chinese industrial firms.  In particular, we employ the latest 
bootstrap-based estimation procedures involving DEA, aggregation, density 
estimation and truncated regression. The results obtained in this paper provide robust 
statistical evidence that contributes to the ownership-performance debate.  While 
some results support the earlier work of Shiu (2000, 2001), others shed significant 
new light on the ownership-performance nexus. 
We confirm that in comparison with state ownership, all the other types of 
ownership we consider result in an improvement in performance.  This finding is 
highly robust, is supported by most of the models and methods employed, and is no 
great surprise.  It confirms the results of many other studies that claim modern China 
is no exception to the economic laws of the free market and related incentives offered 
by the ‗invisible hand‘ of Adam Smith. 
A somewhat unexpected finding that is nevertheless robust is that foreign–
owned firms perform worse on aggregate than non-state local enterprises in the light 
industry sector, but perform slightly better than firms of all other ownership types in 
the heavy industry sector.  To the best of our knowledge, this finding is new to the 
productivity literature and therefore warrants a greater degree of attention than our 
other findings. 
We consider that the main explanation for this phenomenon stems from the 
fact that heavy industry, on average, is more capital-intensive than light industry and 
that purchasing and adopting new technology requires greater financing.  As a result, 
foreign investors in the heavy industry sector, most of which are huge multinational 
corporations, are likely to have an advantage over local firms in introducing more 
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advanced capital equipment and expensive technologies, both of which lead to better 
performance.   
In light industries, even when foreigners have initial technological and capital 
advantages, local private firms should be able to absorb, adopt and disseminate such 
technology according to local specifications more easily and quickly in light 
industries than in heavy ones.  On the other hand, because light industries tend to be 
more labor-intensive than heavy ones, the performance of firms active in the former is 
more likely to be dependent on local content (culture, traditions, habits, etc.).  This is 
likely to give an advantage to local firms and, given a similar level of technology 
adoption, should enable them to become more efficient than their foreign 
counterparts — a prediction we confirm in our study.  
Our explanation of the foreign versus local ownership question in the heavy 
versus light industry puzzle is not entirely new or ad hoc. One theoretical foundation 
for this explanation is closely related to the technology diffusion argument that goes 
back at least to the work of Gerschenkron (1962) and Nelson and Phelps (1966), as 
well as the more recent studies of Grossman and Helpman (1991), Parente, Stephen 
and Prescott (1994), Banks (1994), and Helpman and Rangel (1999), in various areas 
of economics. 
 
Possible Extensions 
It is worth noting that our results are based on cross-sectional data obtained from the 
most recently available national census and leave to one side the empirical estimation 
of changes in efficiency and productivity over time which would be possible with a 
panel data set.  This would be a natural extension of our study and we hope that the 
work presented in this work provides a good foundation for such future research when 
new census data become available. 
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Another natural extension to our work would be to use a non-parametric 
truncated regression method, e.g., proposed by Park, Simar and Zelenyuk (2008), 
which would be possible when more data become available. Yet another interesting 
extension would be to test for the stochastic dominance of the distributions of 
efficiency scores of various ownership groups and regions.
12
   
Overall, we hope that our study spurs theoretical development of related 
methodology issues that can improve our work, as well as encourage more of 
empirical investigations of the current topic using other methods. 
 
                                                 
12
 We thank Paul Wilson for this remark. 
 24 
References 
 
American Chamber of Commerce (ACC). 1998. Business Outlook Survey. 
Banks, Robert B. 1994. Growth and Diffusion Phenomena. Springer Verlag, Berlin. 
Dong, F., Tang, Z. 1995. Studies of Institutional Reforms of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises. 
The People‘s Publisher, Beijing.  
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., Norris, M. and Zhang, Z. 1994. Productivity Growth, Technical 
Progress, and Efficiency Change in Industrialized Countries. American Economic Review 
84:1, 66-83. 
Färe, R., Primont, D. 1995. Multi-Output Production and Duality: Theory and Applications. 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston. 
Färe, R., Zelenyuk, V. 2003. On Aggregate Farrell Efficiencies. European Journal of 
Operations Research 146:3, 615-621. 
Farrell, M.J. 1957. The Measurement of Productive Efficiency. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society 120, 253-281. 
Gerschenkron, A. 1962. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. 1991. Trade, Knowledge Spillovers and Growth. European 
Economic Review 35, 517-26. 
Groves, T., Hong, Y., McMillan, J. and Naughton, B. 1994. Autonomy and Incentives in 
Chinese State Enterprises. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 183-209.  
Helpman, E. and Rangel, A. 1999. Adjusting to a New Technology: Experience and Training. 
Journal of Economic Growth 4, 359-383. 
Henderson, D.J. and Russell, R.R. 2005. Human Capital and Convergence: A Production-
Frontier Approach. International Economic Review 46, 1167-1205. 
Henderson, D.J. and Zelenyuk, V. 2006. Testing for (Efficiency) Catching-up. Southern 
Economic Journal 73:4, 1003–1019.  
Huang, H, Cai, F. and Duncan, R. 1999. Reform of State-Owned Enterprises in China: Key 
Measures and Policy Debate. ANU, Canberra: Asia-Pacific Press. 
Korostelev, A., Simar, L. and Tsybakov, A. 1995. Efficient Estimation of Monotone 
Boundaries. The Annals of Statistics 23:2, 476-489. 
Kneip, A., Park, B. and Simar, L. 1998. A Note on the Convergence of Nonparametric DEA 
Estimators for Production Efficiency Scores. Econometric Theory 14, 783-793. 
Kneip A, Simar L, and Wilson P.W. (2008) "Asymptotics and consistent bootstraps for DEA 
estimators in non-parametric frontier models." Econometric Theory 24:1663–1697. 
Kumar, S. and Russell, R.R. 2002. Technological Change, Technological Catch-up, and 
Capital Deepening: Relative Contributions to Growth and Convergence. American 
Economic Review 92:3, 527– 548. 
 25 
Li, Q. 1996. Nonparametric Testing of Closeness between Two Unknown Distributions. 
Econometric Reviews 15, 261-274. 
Lin, J.Y., Cai, F. and Li, Z. 1998. Competition, Policy Burdens, and State-Owned Enterprise 
Reform. American Economic Review 88:2, 422-427. 
Melvin, S. 1998. Business Group Sizes up Shanghai‘s Investment Climate. China Business 
Review 25:1, 4-4. 
Nelson, R.R. and Phelps, E.S. 1966. Investment in Humans, Technological Diffusion, and 
Economic Growth. American Economic Review 56, 69-75. 
Parente, S.L. and Prescott, E.C. 1994. Barriers to Technology Adoption and Development. 
Journal of Political Economy 102, 298-321. 
Park, B.U., Jeong, S.-O. and Simar, L. 2010. Asymptotic Distribution of Conical-hull 
Estimators of Directional Edges. Annals of Statistics 38: 3, 1320-1340. 
Park, B. U, Simar, L. and Zelenyuk, V. (2008), Local Likelihood Estimation of 
Truncated Regression and its Partial Derivatives: Theory and Application. Journal 
of Econometrics 146, 185-198.  
Russell, R.R. 1990. Continuity of Measures of Technical Efficiency. Journal of Economic 
Theory 52, 255-267. 
Russell, R.R. 1997. Distance Functions in Consumer and Producer Theory in Index Number 
Theory: Essays in Honor of Sten Malmquist. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 7-90. 
Sheather S.J. and Jones M.C. (1991), A reliable data based bandwidth selection 
method for Kernel density estimation. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 3, 
683-690. 
Shiu, A. 2000. Productivity in the Chinese Economy and International Comparisons. Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of New South Wales, Sydney. 
Shiu, A. 2001. Efficiency of Chinese Enterprises. Journal of Productivity Analysis 18, 255-
267. 
Simar, L. and Wilson, P.W. 2007. Estimation and Inference in Two-Stage, Semi-Parametric 
Models of Production Processes. Journal of Econometrics 136, 31-64. 
Simar, L. and Zelenyuk, V. 2007. Statistical Inference For Aggregates Of Farrell-Type 
Efficiencies. Journal of Applied Econometrics 22:7, 1367-1394. 
Simar, L. and Zelenyuk, V. 2006. On Testing Equality of Two Distribution Functions of 
Efficiency Scores Estimated via DEA. Econometric Reviews 25:4, 497-522. 
State Statistical Bureau, 1995. The Data of the Third National Industrial Census of the 
People‘s Republic of China 1995. Beijing: State Statistical Bureau. 
Transparency International. 2001. Global Corruption Report (http://www.globalcorruption-
report.org/). 
 26 
Wei, Z., Varela, O. and Hassan, M.K. 2002. Ownership and Performance in Chinese 
Manufacturing Industry. Journal of Multinational Financial Management 12, 61-78.  
Weitzman, M.L. and Xu, C. 1994. Chinese Township-Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined 
Cooperatives. Journal of Comparative Economics 18, 121-145. 
Weldon, E. and Vanhonacker, W. 1999. Operating a Foreign-Invested Enterprise in China: 
Challenges for Managers and Management Researchers. Journal of World Business 34, 
94-107. 
Wu, Y. 1996. Productive Performance in Chinese Enterprises – An Empirical Study. 
Macmillan Press, London. 
Wu, Y. 1998. Redundancy and Firm Characteristics in Chinese State-Owned Enterprises. The 
Asia Pacific Journal of Economics and Business 2, 33-44. 
Yeung, G. and Mok, V. 2002. Government Policy and the Competitive Advantages of 
Foreign-Financed Firms in Guangdong Province of Southern China. Asian Business and 
Management 1, 227-247. 
Zelenyuk, V. 2009. Power of Significance Test of Dummies in Simar-Wilson Two-Stage 
Efficiency Analysis Model. Applied Economics Letters 16:15, 1493-1497. 
Zelenyuk, V. and Zheka, V. 2006. Corporate Governance and Firm‘s Efficiency:  The Case of 
a Transitional Country, Ukraine.  Journal of Productivity Analysis 25, 143-168. 
Zheng, J. and Hu, A. 2004. An Empirical Analysis of Provincial Productivity in China (1979-
2001). Paper presented at the 15
th
 Annual Conference of the Chinese Economic 
Association (UK). 
Zheng, J., Liu, X. and Bigsten, A. 1998. Ownership Structure and Determinants of Technical 
Efficiency: An Application of Data Envelopment Analysis to Chinese Enterprises (1986-
1990). Journal of Comparative Economics 26, 465-484. 
Zhang, X.G. and Zhang, S. 2001. Technical Efficiency in China‘s Iron and Steel Industry: 
Evidence from the New Census Data. International Review of Applied Economics 15, 
199-211. 
 
 27 
Table 1. Simar-Zenlenyuk-adapted for DEA Li-test for Equality of Efficiency 
Distributions Across Different Types of Ownership 
 
Null Hypothesis Test 
Statistic 
 
p-val. 
Test 
Statistic 
 
p-val. 
Test 
Statistic 
 
p-val. 
 Light Industry Heavy Industry Both Industries 
f(effSOE) = f(effFFE) 10.61 0.00 5.83 0.00 16.6 0.00 
f(effSOE) = f(effTOE) 12.24 0.00 0.47 0.47 18.2 0.00 
f(effSOE) = f(effCOE) 12.39 0.00 0.21 0.76 13.52 0.00 
f(effFFE) = f(effTOE) 2.32 0.01 1.24 0.07 1.01 0.08 
f(effFFE) = f(effCOE) 1.19 0.06 4.52 0.00 -0.13 0.85 
f(effTOE) = f(effCOE) 0.55 0.34 1.23 0.06 1.32 0.56 
 
Notes: All calculations are done by authors in Matlab using, after adopting from programs used for the 
work in Simar and Zelenyuk (2006). 
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Table 2.  The Light Industry:  Group-Wise Heterogeneous Sub-Sampling Bootstrap for 
Aggregate Efficiencies (aggregation into 4 types of ownership) 
 
  Original Bootstrap Estimate of Est. 95% Conf. Int. 
 
Groups 
Reciprocal 
of DEA 
Estimates 
Standard 
Deviation 
Bias-Corr. 
Eff. Score 
(reciprocal) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
 Bound 
       
Weighted 
(output shares) 
group 
efficiencies 
1 0.55 0.26 0.43 0.39 0.55 
2 0.71 0.13 0.62 0.57 0.74 
3 0.83 0.07 0.75 0.71 0.88 
4 0.79 0.09 0.71 0.67 0.83 
      
All 0.69 0.14 0.59 0.55 0.70 
       
Non-weighted  
group 
efficiencies 
1 0.53 0.3 0.41 0.36 0.53 
2 0.66 0.18 0.55 0.51 0.71 
3 0.75 0.12 0.65 0.61 0.80 
4 0.72 0.13 0.62 0.58 0.77 
      
All 0.65 0.18 0.54 0.50 0.66 
       
RD statistics for 
comparing 
groups in terms 
of weighted 
average 
efficiencies 
1 vs. 2*** 1.30 0.11 1.48 1.23 1.62 
1 vs. 3*** 1.50 0.18 1.80 1.38 2.00 
1 vs. 4*** 1.43 0.15 1.70 1.35 1.87 
2 vs. 3** 1.16 0.08 1.23 1.02 1.33 
2 vs. 4** 1.10 0.06 1.16 1.01 1.24 
3 vs. 4 0.95 0.05 0.93 0.85 1.06 
       
RD statistics for 
comparing 
groups in terms 
of non-weighted 
average 
efficiencies 
1 vs. 2*** 1.26 0.11 1.40 1.13 1.54 
1 vs. 3*** 1.43 0.16 1.67 1.30 1.84 
1 vs. 4*** 1.38 0.14 1.60 1.27 1.74 
2 vs. 3* 1.14 0.08 1.21 0.98 1.31 
2 vs. 4* 1.10 0.07 1.15 0.96 1.25 
3 vs. 4 
 
0.96 
 
0.05 
 
0.95 
 
0.84 
 
1.08 
 
 
Notes: Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 refer to SOEs, FFEs, TOEs and COEs, respectively. Also, ***, ** and * 
indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of          
          at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, 
respectively.   
For convenience, we present reciprocals of estimated efficiency scores, i.e.,             
 
,            (and 
the corresponding confidence intervals) so that they have percentage meaning.  All calculations are done by 
authors in Matlab using, after adopting from programs used for the work in Simar and Zelenyuk (2007). 
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Table 3.  The Heavy Industry:  Group-Wise Heterogeneous Sub-Sampling Bootstrap for 
Aggregate Efficiencies (aggregation into 4 types of ownership) 
 
 
Groups 
 
Original Bootstrap Estimate of Est. 95% Conf. Int. 
DEA 
Estimates 
Standard 
Deviation 
Bias-Corr. 
Eff. Score 
(reciprocal) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
       
Weighted 
(output shares) 
group 
efficiencies 
1 0.81 0.06 0.75 0.70 0.82 
2 0.88 0.04 0.83 0.79 0.87 
3 0.87 0.04 0.81 0.78 0.89 
4 0.83 0.06 0.76 0.72 0.85 
      
All 0.83 0.04 0.77 0.73 0.83 
       
Non-weighted  
group 
efficiencies 
1 0.79 0.07 0.74 0.68 0.80 
2 0.86 0.04 0.81 0.78 0.86 
3 0.83 0.05 0.75 0.71 0.82 
4 0.79 0.07 0.71 0.67 0.81 
      
All 0.82 0.04 0.75 0.72 0.81 
       
RD statistics for 
comparing 
groups in terms 
of weighted 
average 
efficiencies 
1 vs. 2 1.09 0.06 1.09 0.98 1.21 
1 vs. 3 1.08 0.06 1.08 0.97 1.18 
1 vs. 4 1.03 0.05 1.00 0.90 1.09 
2 vs. 3 0.99 0.04 0.98 0.90 1.07 
2 vs. 4 0.95 0.05 0.91 0.83 1.02 
3 vs. 4 0.95 0.04 0.93 0.85 1.03 
       
RD statistics for 
comparing 
groups in terms 
of non-weighted 
average 
efficiencies 
1 vs. 2* 1.08 0.06 1.10 0.99 1.21 
1 vs. 3 1.04 0.05 1.01 0.91 1.10 
1 vs. 4 1.00 0.06 0.95 0.84 1.04 
2 vs. 3* 0.96 0.04 0.91 0.83 1.01 
2 vs. 4*** 0.92 0.06 0.85 0.76 0.98 
3 vs. 4 
 
0.97 
 
0.04 
 
0.94 
 
0.86 
 
1.03 
 
 
Notes: Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 refer to SOEs, FFEs, TOEs and COEs, respectively. Also, ***, ** and * 
indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of          
          at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, 
respectively.   
For convenience, we present reciprocals of estimated efficiency scores, i.e.,             
 
,            (and 
the corresponding confidence intervals) so that they have percentage meaning.  All calculations are done by 
authors in Matlab using, after adopting from programs used for the work in Simar and Zelenyuk (2007). 
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Table 4.  Result of Truncated Regression Analysis for Explaining Inefficiency Level 
 
 
 
Interpretation of Variables 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Model 7 
 
Model 8 
 
Model 9 
 
Model 10 
 
 
Intercept 
 
Constant 2.96
**
 2.96
**
 2.96
**
 2.94
**
 3.33
**
 3.29
**
 1.61
**
 1.61
**
 2.45
**
 1.36
**
 
Industry Industry Dummy (1 if Light, 0 o.w.) 0.00 - -0.04 - Light Light Heavy Heavy Light Heavy 
D1 Ownership Dummy (1 if SOE, 0 o.w.) - - - - - - - - 0.84
**
 0.25
**
 
D2 Ownership Dummy (1 if FFE, 0 o.w.) -0.73
**
 -0.72
**
 -0.73
**
 -0.72
**
 -0.85
**
 -0.84
**
 -0.26
**
 -0.25
**
 - - 
D3 Ownership Dummy (1 if TOE, 0 o.w.) -0.90
**
 -0.89
**
 -0.89
**
 -0.88
**
 -1.28
**
 -1.27
**
 -0.13
**
 -0.13
**
 -0.42
**
 0.12
**
 
D4 Ownership Dummy (1 if COE, 0 o.w.) -0.69
**
 -0.69
**
 -0.68
**
 -0.68 -1.06
**
 -1.05
**
 -0.04
*
 -0.04
*
 -0.21
**
 0.21
**
 
D5 Region Dummy (1 if Coastal, 0 o.w.) 0.05 0.05 - - 0.09 - 0.00 - - - 
D6 Region Dummy (1 if Central, 0 o.w.) -0.04 -0.04 - - -0.04 - 0.01 - - - 
Log(y) Measure of Size  -0.14
**
 -0.14
**
 -0.14
**
 -0.14
**
 -0.20
**
 -0.19
**
 -0.04
**
 -0.04
**
 -0.19
**
 -0.04
**
 
σ2 
 
Variance of the error term 0.08
**
 
 
0.08
**
 
 
0.08
**
 
 
0.08
**
 
 
0.10
**
 
 
0.11
**
 
 
0.01
**
 
 
0.01
**
 
 
0.11
**
 
 
0.01
**
 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is ―efficiency score‖ (see eq. (8)-(9) in the text). Note that * and ** indicate significance at   being    and    , respectively.  Significance tests 
are based on bootstrapped confidence intervals, using Algorithm 2 of Simar and Wilson (2006), with 1000 and 2000 bootstrap replications for bias correction and for 
confidence intervals, respectively.  All calculations are done by authors in Matlab using code of Valentin Zelenyuk, which adopted some earlier codes of Leopold Simar. 
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Figure 1. Estimated Densities of Individual Efficiency Scores for Ownership Groups 
in Light Industry. 
Notes: 
i 
Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 refer to SOEs, FFEs, TOEs and COEs, respectively. 
ii 
Vertical axis refers to (estimated) probability density function of the distribution of 
the efficiency scores and horizontal axis refers to efficiency scores. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Estimated Densities of Individual Efficiency Scores for Ownership Groups 
in Heavy Industry. 
Notes: 
i 
Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 refer to SOEs, FFEs, TOEs and COEs, respectively. 
ii 
Vertical axis refers to (estimated) probability density function of the distribution of 
the efficiency scores and horizontal axis refers to efficiency scores. 
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APPENDIX 
 
All inputs and outputs used in our activity analysis model for the DEA estimator are 
measured in units of one hundred million Chinese yuan. Total wage refers to the total 
remuneration paid to staff and workers during a certain period. This includes wages, 
salaries and other payments to staff and workers regardless of their source, category 
and form (in kind or in cash). The net value of fixed assets is calculated as the original 
value of fixed assets minus depreciation, in which the original value of fixed assets 
owned by the enterprise is calculated as the price paid at the time the assets were 
purchased, installed, reconstructed, expanded or subject to technical innovation and 
transformation. These include expenses incurred in purchasing, packaging, 
transportation and installation, and so on. The value of intermediate inputs is proxied 
as the difference between the gross value of industrial output and value added. These 
are goods that have been processed in one production process and then sold for final 
processing in another production process. The gross industrial output is the total 
volume of industrial products sold or available for sale in value terms. It includes the 
value of finished products and the value of industrial services.  
Tables A1 and A2 show the summary statistics for each ownership type in the 
heavy and light industry sectors, respectively. See Shiu (2000, 2001) for more 
information and a discussion of the data set. 
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Table A1. Summary Statistics for Ownership Types (Heavy Industry) 
 
 Gross Industrial Output  Net Value of Fixed Assets  Total Wage  Intermediate Inputs  
 (hundred million yuan)  (hundred million yuan)  (hundred million yuan)  (hundred million yuan)  
Ownership Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.  
SOEs 609.05  401.22  568.77  322.74  65.89  39.96   396.75  267.34  
COEs 152.79  258.26  89.19  181.46  6.71  10.36   111.00  189.47  
TOEs 197.71  295.94  58.73  75.45  12.69  15.65   147.86  227.69  
FFEs 152.79  258.26   89.19  181.46    6.71  10.36   111.00  189.47   
 
 
Table A2. Summary Statistics for Ownership Types (Light Industry) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Panel A:  Panel B:  Panel C:  Panel D:  
 Gross Industrial Output  Net Value of Fixed Assets  Total Wage  Intermediate Inputs  
 (hundred million yuan)  (hundred million yuan)  (hundred million yuan)  (hundred million yuan)  
Ownership Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.  
SOEs 283.51  206.26   167.44  110.05   22.86  15.94   209.46  157.48  
COEs 278.80  354.33   86.06  93.20   22.23  21.97   206.38  273.89  
TOEs 204.01  336.27   52.84  88.17   11.36  19.00   158.39  263.53  
FFEs 216.65  405.08   82.45  134.91    12.22  23.89   169.26  318.28   
